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It is vital that the human brain which has conceived, perceived, and then de-
scribed DNA, the double helix, and the basic forms of life, should have the wis-
dom to construct rational rules for the global conduct of genetic research, experi-
mentation, and manipulation. Not to do so is to make a decision.
-The Honorable Justice Michael Kirby, President of the Australian Court of Ap-
peal of New South Wales'
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INTRODUCTION
On Monday, January 20, 1997, during his second inaugural
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speech, President Clinton made a passing reference to the Human
Genome2 Project3 (HGP) as an example of the United States' in-
credible advances in technology during the 20th century.4 He did not,
however, discuss the United States' initiation of a major controversy
surrounding the HGP when it filed patent applications for partial
gene sequences in 1993. 5 The action of the United States was espe-
2. The human genome is the "entire complement of genetic material in the set
of chromosomes of a particular organism." George J. Annas, Mapping the Human
Genome and the Meaning of Monster Mythology, 39 EMORY L.J. 629, 636 (1990);
see PAUL SINGLETON & DIANE SAINSBURY, DICTIONARY OF MICROBIOLOGY AND
MOLECULAR BIOLOGY 384 (1987) (explaining that a genome is "the genetic mate-
rial of an organism"). The human genome contains approximately 100,000 genes,
which consist of an estimated 3.3 billion base pairs. See Kirby, supra note 1, at 7-
8; Elizabeth J. Thomson, Ethical, Legal and Social Implications of the Human Ge-
nome Project, 4 DICK. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 55, 55 (1994). Each human chromo-
some consists of between 50,000 and 100,000 genes, which are in turn made up of
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA). See Annas, supra, at 636. DNA is the "chemical
carrier of genetic information." Id DNA is made up of two nucleotides that encir-
cle each other in a double helix. See id Nucleotides compose the weak links be-
tween the ladder of the double helix: adenine (A), guanine (G), cytosine (C), and
thymine (7). See D. Benjamin Borson, Ph.D., The Human Genome Projects: Pat-
enting Human Genes and Biotechnology: Is the Human Genome Patentable?, 35
IDEA 461, 464 (1995). Thus, As only bond with Ts, and Cs only bond with Gs.
See Annas, supra, at 636. The total number of such base pairs determines the size
of the genome. See id. The forty-six human chromosomes consist of approxi-
mately three billion of these base pairs. See id
3. The Human Genome Project (HGP) is an international attempt to map and
sequence the approximately one hundred thousand genes of the human body. See
Thomson, supra note 2, at 55; Kirby, supra note 1, at 7-8. Experts characterize the
Human Genome Project as the largest concerted biological project ever attempted.
See id at 8; see also G. Kenneth Smith & Denise M. Kettelberger, Patents and the
Human Genome Project, 22 AIPLA Q.J. 27, 30 (1994) (stating that scientists have
not attempted to achieve the same goal since the atomic age). The project consists
of mapping and sequencing all chromosomes; that is, determining the location of
the DNA markers, which act as signs to indicate where specific genes lie on each
chromosome, and then finding the exact location of these genes. See Julia Walsh,
Reproductive Rights and the Human Genome Project, 4 S. CAL. REv. L. &
WOMEN'S STUD. 145, 146-47 (1994); Kendra Hogue, Local Doctor/Lamyer Ex-
plores Potential of Genes, BUS. J. (PORTLAND), Mar. 17, 1995, at 1 (interviewing a
doctor who testified before Congress about the Human Genome Project). Scientists
estimate that the project will be completed by 2005. See id at 2 (explaining that
completion of the project is expected to take five to ten years).
4. President Bill Clinton, Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 1997), reprinted in
WASH. POST, Jan. 21, 1997, at A15. Clinton also made reference to the Human
Genome Project two weeks later in his State of the Union Address. See Clinton
Sets Forth New Challenge, DES MOINES REG., Feb. 5, 1997, at 11.
5. The patenting actions of the United States outraged the international corn-
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cially controversial considering the international community's previ-
ous agreement to collaborate on the project and share its findings
when the HGP began in 1988.6 Since this agreement, however, as
private corporations have increased their involvement in the project,
they have begun to attempt to patent their discoveries of partial gene
sequences7 in an effort to protect their investments.' This attempt to
claim property rights in the monumental discoveries resulting from
an international collaborative effort outraged many members of the
international community.' The international scientific community
also questioned how private parties could own an integral body part
of every human being.' Many people also felt uncomfortable about
companies" owning property rights to such a largely unregulated and
munity because the international community commenced the HGP with the intent
that all countries would openly share the discoveries derived therefrom. See Bar-
bara Looney, Should Genes Be Patented? The Gene Patenting Controversy: Legal,
Ethical, and Policy Foundations of an International Agreement, 26 LAW & POL'Y
INT'L Bus. 231, 231-233 (1994) (explaining that the French decided not to patent
their completion of the world's first physical map of the genome, whereas the
United States filed for genome patents). For further discussion regarding this con-
troversy between the United States and the international community, see infra
notes 66-68, 85-98, and accompanying text.
6. See Borson, supra note 2, at 475. For further discussion on the background
of the HGP, see infra notes 23-65 and accompanying text.
7. A partial gene sequence is an incomplete part of a gene that does not serve
any function on its own for determining what protein the gene expresses. See
Kathleen Day, Human Genome Sciences Granted 3 Gene Patents, WASH. POST,
Apr. 17, 1996, at F1 (explaining that the function of partial gene sequences is not
well understood).
8. For example, Human Genome Sciences Inc. of Rockville, Maryland, which
has been trying to patent gene sequences for several years, received several patents
in 1996; in fact, it received the first United States patents on gene sequences. See
Human Genome Sciences Inc.: Company's First 3 Patents, for Human Genes, Are
Won, WALL ST. J., Apr. 17, 1996, at A9 [hereinafter Human Genome Sciences
Inc.]; Charles Craig, Human Genome Sciences Gets First Gene Patents,
BIOWORLD TODAY, Apr. 18, 1996, at 30; Day, supra note 7, at Fl. The patents
were for "full-length human genes involved with osteoporosis, inflammation, and
cell damage." Human Genome Sciences Inc., supra, at A9. For further discussion
regarding companies' patenting of gene sequences, see infra notes 85-89 and ac-
companying text.
9. See infra notes 92-96 and accompanying text (discussing the international
community's feelings of betrayal at the actions of the United States in filing patent
applications).
10. See infra notes 165-172 and accompanying text (discussing the integral
nature of the HGP to every human being).
11. This note uses the United States and private companies interchangeably in
a discussion about patenting gene sequences because the United States has acted
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powerful tool.12
As a result of the international outcry regarding the patenting of
partial DNA sequences, as well as varying worldwide conceptions of
property rights,13 the international community must come to a con-
sensus sufficient to allow the setting of international guidelines for
the HGP.'4 One model for such guidelines is the Common Heritage
of Humankind 5 principle, applied in the past to the deep seabeds, 6
Antarctica, 7 and the Moon and other celestial bodies." The Common
Heritage concept would convey property rights of the genome to all
people by recognizing that the genome is integral to every human
being. 9 The Common Heritage concept gives the responsibility for
on behalf of private companies in filing patent applications. See Christopher J.
Harnett, The Human Genome Project and the Downside of Federal Technology
Transfer, 5 RISK: HEALTH, SAFETY & ENV'T 151, 151-52 (1994). Some commen-
tators argue that the action of the United States in acting on behalf of private inter-
ests is unconstitutional. See generally Thomas Lizzi, Comment, From Benevolent
Administration to Government Employee Inventions, Human Genomes, and Exclu-
sive Licensing: Is Governmental Ownership of Patents Constitutional?, 34 DuQ. L.
REV. 299, 302-03 (1996). For further discussion on this dual interest, see infra
note 86 and accompanying text.
12. See infra note 175 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of regula-
tion concerning the HGP).
13. Third World countries tend to de-emphasize the importance of intellectual
property rights because they believe that people cannot privately own intangible
things. See Amy E. Carroll, Comment, Not Always the Best Medicine: Biotechnol-
ogy and the Global Impact of US. Patent Lmv, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 2433, 2465
(1995). For further discussion of developing countries' de-emphasis of intellectual
property rights, see infra notes 133-140 and accompanying text.
14. For further discussion regarding proposed guidelines, see infra Part IV
(proposing an international convention applying the Common Heritage of Man-
kind concept to the human genome).
15. Some experts argue that the Common Heritage concept has become a uni-
versally accepted part of international lav and has attained the level ofjus cogens.
See COvEY T. OLIVER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL SYSTEM 279 (4th ed. 1995).
16. For further discussion concerning application of the Common Heritage
principle to the deep seabeds, see infra note 150 and accompanying text.
17. For further discussion concerning application of the Common Heritage
principle to Antarctica, see infra note 151 and accompanying text.
18. For further discussion concerning application of the Common Heritage
principle to the moon and other celestial bodies, see infra note 152 and accompa-
nying text.
19. See Looney, supra note 5, at 234 (explaining the ethical arguments ad-
vanced on behalf of the Common Heritage principle). The basic thrust of this ethi-
cal argument is that genes are a "common, universal possession, representative of
humankind's collective heritage, and thus perhaps not a subject matter for which
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regulating the uses of the genome, as well as the benefits of the proj-
ect, to all of humanity.20 Thus, because the human genome is an even
more integral part of humankind than the traditional applications of
the Common Heritage concept,2 l the Common Heritage principle
should apply to the human genome.
This Comment will argue that the Common Heritage principle
should provide the basis for an international guideline to regulate use
of the genome by encompassing the international community's sen-
timent of international collaboration. 22 Part I provides background in-
formation on the HGP, as well as the benefits and drawbacks of se-
quencing the genome. Part II discusses the legal controversy
surrounding the patenting of the genome. Part III discusses the ad-
vantages of applying the Common Heritage concept to the human
genome. Finally, Part IV provides recommendations for employing
the Common Heritage principle with respect to the HGP, in the form
of a proposed treaty.
I. THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT
A. BENEFITS AND DRAWBACKS OF THE HGP
Scientists believe that the HGP will provide innumerable medical
breakthroughs. 23 The HGP will enable scientists to treat patients with
genetically caused disorders more efficiently and effectively. 24 Map-
individual intellectual property rights should be granted." Id.
20. For further discussion on the applicability of the HGP to the Common
Heritage principle, see infra notes 150-185 and accompanying text (explaining the
applicability of the Common Heritage concept to the human genome).
21. The genome is integral to humankind because it provides the essence of
humankind, through expression of our past, as well as future traits. See Looney,
supra note 5, at 234.
22. See id.
23. See Thomson, supra note 2, at 55. The United States embarked on this
project not only in order to achieve medical breakthroughs, but also to create "a
vehicle for technological advance and creation ofjobs and wealth." Robert Mullan
Cook-Deegan, Origins of the Human Genome Project, 5 RISK: HEALTH, SAFETY &
ENV'T 97, 99 (1994). The project began as an academically-oriented endeavor but
has veered more towards commercial interests in the past few years. See id. at 97.
In the next few years, the HGP is likely to head more towards "commercial appli-
cation, exploiting the rapidly growing body of knowledge about DNA structure to
the pursuit of practical benefits." Id.
24. See Thomson, supra note 2, at 56 (explaining that mapping and sequencing
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ping and sequencing the genome will also enable pharmaceutical
companies to create more effective drugs.' Scientists expect the re-
sults of the HGP to be "the source book for biomedical science in the
Twenty-First Century." 
26
Along with these expected medical breakthroughs come signifi-
cant drawbacks and serious consequences. The first drawback is cost.
Some scientists argue that the multi-million dollar funding that spon-
sors pump into the HGP could be better spent on researching the lo-
cation of the genes that cause specific diseases." Scientists estimate
that only two to five percent of the genome contains actual genes,
the genome will produce information that will enable doctors to detect and diag-
nose diseases, as well as eventually prevent and cure genetically-related diseases).
25. See Hogue, supra note 3, at 5 (explaining that the HGP will provide a great
potential for pharmaceuticals). This potential lies partly in the fact that "[e]ach
new gene is a potential target for drug development-to fix it when broken, to shut
it down, to attenuate or amplify its expression, or to change its product, usually a
protein." Cook-Deegan, supra note 23, at 97.
26. See Hogue, supra note 3, at 1. Indeed, the National Institutes of Health has
a web site of diseases it has mapped. See The National Ctr. for Biotechnology
Info., Nat'I Inst. of Health, A Gene Map of the Human Genome (visited Feb. 20,
1997) <http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/SCIENCE96>.
27. See Kirby, supra note 1, at 8; Smith & Kettelberger, supra note 3, at 38
(discussing the argument that research might be more effective if geared towards
sequencing the specific proteins DNA expresses [the cDNA approach]). Through
the cDNA approach, scientists translate messenger RNA (mRNA) into proteins
which "physically manifest genetic traits." Smith & Kettelberger, supra note 3, at
44. This process concentrates on the proteins as a basis, which necessarily mean
that the gene has a specific function. See id at 44 (stating that proteins manifest
specific traits). The cDNA approach uses genetic information derived from mRNA
to discover the genes responsible for specific diseases. See id at 38.
This approach contrasts with the more arduous structural approach that in-
volves discovery of partial sequences of cDNA, or Expressed Sequence Tags
(ESTs). See Borson, supra note 2, at 477. ESTs are almost never complete and do
not code for a complete functional protein, and thus they are not useful on their
own. See id
For definitional purposes, the difference between RNA and DNA is that RNA's
protein composition varies slightly, in that uracil replaces the thymine found in
DNA. See Smith & Kettelberger, supra note 3, at 44 n. 125; see also supra note 2
(explaining the protein sequence of DNA). Messenger RNA is "an RNA molecule
which functions as a template for the assembly of amino acids during protein syn-
thesis." Singleton & Sainsbury, supra note 2, at 567. Amino acids are the mole-
cules, which comprise proteins. See Smith & Kettelberger, supra note 3, at 44
n.125. One way in which genetic defects occur is that one amino acid substitutes
for another, which causes a genetic disorder such as sickle cell anemia. See id. at
44 nn. 125, 127.
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and that the remaining 95-98 percent are "junk genes, which are
of little use in the HGP. 9
Further, knowledge of an individual's genetic makeup can lead to
insurance and employment discrimination.3" Discrimination, for ex-
ample, can occur through the institutional denial of benefits, treat-
ment, or employment to an individual whose genetic makeup fore-
tells a likelihood that the individual will develop a disorder.3 Genetic
screening is especially discriminatory because it can result in the de-
nial of insurance benefits, even if the individual is completely
healthy. 32
In addition to discrimination, privacy and informed consent issues
will also arise.33 DNA is present in every cell of a person's body and
is easily accessible.34 Therefore, it is likely that, through hair or
blood, for example, a person's genetic makeup can be tested without
the individual's consent.35 Because an individual's DNA is as unique
as the person's fingerprint, the ability to read a person's DNA not
only raises dire privacy issues, it also provides the examiner with an
28. See id. at 38. "Junk genes" are genetic material that do not actually carry
codes for proteins and, therefore, do not express a known genetic function. See id.
at 38 n.79. Although "junk genes" may promote regulatory functions, these func-
tions are presently unknown and therefore have little use in the HGP. See id.
29. See Smith & Kettelberger, supra note 3, at 38 n.79.
30. See id. at 39; see Thomson, supra note 2, at 62.
31. See Thomson, supra note 2, at 62; Smith & Kettelberger, supra note 3, at
39.
32. See Thomson, supra note 2, at 62; Smith & Kettelberger, supra note 3, at
39. Some examples of this discrimination involved: an insurance company deny-
ing coverage to a healthy individual because the company found him to carry Gau-
cher's disease. See Thomson, supra note 2, at 62. In another example, a prenatal
screening showed a couple that their child had cystic fibrosis. See id. Even though
the child was not born yet, the insurance company told the couple that the insur-
ance would not cover the child. See id.
33. See JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE
CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 10 (1996) (discussing privacy is-
sues). In this context, privacy involves an individual's right to limit disclosure of
the content of his/her genetic traits. See id. (discussing examples such as insurance
discrimination).
34. See Thomson, supra note 2, at 61.
35. See id. A good example of this violation of privacy and informed consent,
as well as mobility of DNA, is the case of Moore v. Regents of Cal., in which
Moore gave consent to blood tests and surgery but did not consent to, nor have
knowledge of, the use of his cells to develop a profitable cell line. See 51 Cal.3d
120, 793 P.2d 479 (1990).
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open book on the person."
With the discovery of the functions of various genes, the human
genome project also carries with it the potential of eugenic abuse.37
Although the HGP is currently focused on using genetic information
to treat diseases, 38 the potential exists to eventually change the focus
from medical treatment and prevention of disease to enhancement
and improvement of the human race.39 Eugenics dealing with the
human genome are ethically questionable not only because they con-
stitute toying with nature and "playing God," but also because they
are reprehensible on a scientific basis by decreasing biodiversity."
Moreover, eugenics could alter evolution on a societal level because
only the rich could afford an operation to enhance their children's
genes.
41
36. See Boyle, supra note 33, at 10-11 (explaining the ramifications of reading
a person's DNA). Not only can DNA knowledge lead to insurance discrimination,
but it also provides a unique ability to understand the genetic roots of behavior and
the location of the gene for homosexuality. See id. Because such knowledge is pri-
vate to the individual, it should not be accessible to anyone without the individ-
ual's consent. See id.
37. "Eugenics" is the ability to choose certain qualities in one's children, such
as intelligence, eye color, and weight. See Walsh, supra note 3, at 151-52 (dis-
cussing the potential for the creation of" superbabies" ).
38. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (noting that the purpose of the
HGP is to treat diseases).
39. See Annas, supra note 2, at 647. Some scientists scoff at this fear, however.
See id They argue that, due to the complexity of the genome, it is almost impossi-
ble to find the correct place to insert the desired gene, not to mention the difficulty
involved in finding donors. See Borson, supra note 2, at 463.
40. "Biodiversity" refers to "biological diversity in an environment as indi-
cated by numbers of different species of plants and animals." MERR1AM-
WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 115 (10th ed. 1993). By altering the genes
of one's baby, an individual is essentially changing the gene pool, thus reducing
the variety of the human race. See Kirby, supra note 1, at 14 (relying on a state-
ment by James Watson, discoverer of DNA, at the Bilbao Conference). Many
speakers at the Bilbao Conference on the ethical issues surrounding the HGP at-
tested to this idea. See id James Watson stated that "variation has been the basis
of our evolution. Without the differential of survival of more fit variants, we as
human beings would not have our highly empowered brains that have led us to de-
velop the languages... that underlie the creation of our various civilizations." Id.
In fact the conference incorporated the concept of genetic diversity into its decla-
ration by stating that "genetic variations, like social diversity, constitute attributes
of free human beings. The idea of a monochrome genetic 'perfection' and of
eliminating the precious variety of humanity by genetic means was declared to be
socially repulsive." Id. at 19 (quoting the Conference Declaration).
41. See Annas, supra note 2, at 645-46.
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Although the ability to manipulate one's genes through the results
of the HGP is still in the distant future, genetics-centered eugenic
practices occur in some countries today. For example, through cur-
rent gene therapy technology, if a woman discovers that the fetus she
is carrying contains a genetic defect, she can opt to abort that fetus,
thus changing the gene pool.
42
The largest problem with the project is that most people do not
even know it exists,"3 even though the results of the project will cer-
tainly affect them.' As a result of this lack of public knowledge, the
project was conceived and implemented without any input from the
public, and thus, without much thought about regulations, whether
the benefits outweigh the costs, or even whether the project should
occur at all.45 The lack of public knowledge becomes a greater threat
42. See Thomson, supra note 2, at 69. Indeed, China currently engages in this
practice. See Mike Pezzella, Landmark Deal Between China and French Firm
Raises Eugenics Fears, BIOTECHNOLOGY NEWSWATCH, Dec. 2, 1996, at 6 avail-
able in 1996 WL84541 10. The 1995 Maternal and Infantile Health Law strongly
encourages families with histories of genetic problems to undergo genetic screen-
ing. See id If a fetus has a particular genetic problem, the doctor has a legal obli-
gation to recommend that the woman abort the fetus. See id. Surprisingly, James
Watson also recently stated that "[i]f you could find the gene which determines
sexuality and a woman decides she doesn't want a homosexual child, we'll let her
[abort it]." Victoria MacDonald, Abort Babies with Gay Genes, Says Nobel Win-
ner, LONDON DAILY TELEGRAPH, Feb. 16, 1997, at I. This statement provoked in-
stant worldwide controversy. See id.
43. See Kirby, supra note 1, at 14 (discussing the statement of Dr. Frits Hon-
dius of the Netherlands who predicted that if one asked a random section of the
population whether they have ever heard of the Human Genome Project, the result
would be zero); Boyle, supra note 33, at 194 (stating that intellectual property
rights are "fencing off 'the commons', and yet-in striking contrast to the reaction
over the deep sea bed-the international community seems unaware of the fact").
44. See id. Indeed, "[p]erhaps nowhere is the promise of benefit and the risk of
harm so great as in genetic research." Annas, supra note 2, at 629.
45. See Annas, supra note 2, at 629 (noting that the application of new knowl-
edge often leads to unforeseen value conflicts). Many scientists at the Bilbao Con-
ference voiced concern that scientists and governments initiated and funded the
HGP without any input from the public. See Kirby, supra note 1, at 14. Some
speakers at the conference, such as Dr. Frits Hondius, insisted that those who fund,
administer, and execute the project have a moral responsibility to also inform the
public about the project. See id. Because the goals of the HGP and the list of legal,
ethical, and social issues arising from it are almost identical, scientists "have given
no more thought to the potential social applications of genome mapping and se-
quencing than Victor Frankenstein had given to the consequences of creating his
monster, or than Dr. Moreau had given to the consequences of his experiments in
modifying life forms." Annas, supra note 2, at 660.
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to society as scientists make more discoveries and move from the
realm of theory to the more powerful realm of action.46 The public's
lack of awareness about companies' genome patents will prevent any
public challenges against companies' assertions of property rights to
the genome.4
B. HGP EFFORTS IN THE UNITED STATES4"
Although the Human Genome Project is an international effort,
most of the work is occurring in the United States.49 The United
States government has contributed over three billion dollars to the
project over the last 15 years.5" Even though university scientists
46. See Kirby, supra note 1, at 15 (stating that the international community
should be especially sensitive to the risks of an accelerated rate of experimenta-
tion, in light of the worldwide ignorance of the horrors of Nazi experimentation).
47. See id
48. In 1985, three scientists independently conceived of the project. The scien-
tists included: Robert Sinsheimer, then-Chancellor of the University of California
at Santa Cruz, who determined that the project was feasible through three scientific
meetings between 1985 and 1986; Renato Dulbecco of the Salk Institute, who was
originally driven to the idea of the mapping of the genome as a way to understand
the genetic origins of cancer; and Charles DeLisi, who conceived of sequencing
the genome under the direction of the Department of Energy. See Smith & Kettel-
berger, supra note 3, at 29-30; Carroll, supra note 13, at 2434; Borson, supra note
2, at 475; Cook-Deegan, supra note 23, at 102. The Department of Energy was
originally interested in the project because it wanted to know why offspring of
atom bomb survivors had increased mutation rates. See Cook-Deegan, supra note
23, at 103; Smith & Kettelberger, supra note 3, at 30. Although the project was by
no means permanently implemented at the Sinscheimer meeting, the hurried deci-
sion to sequence the genome merely because it was "desirable and feasible" dem-
onstrated a lack of attention to ethical, legal, or societal ramifications of a decision
of this magnitude. See Annas, supra note 2, at 635 (stating that many scientists feel
that their job is merely to search for new knowledge, and that it is society's re-
sponsibility to "use, misuse, apply, or misapply that knowledge"). The scientists
organized the project in conjunction with the Department of Energy and the Na-
tional Institutes of Health. See Thomson, supra note 2, at 55.
49. See Smith & Kettelberger, supra note 3, at 29-30.
50. See Mark A. Urbanski, Note, Chemical Prospecting, Biodiversity Conser-
vation, and the Importance of International Protection of Intellectual Property
Rights in Biological Materials, 2 BUFF. J. INT'L L. 131, 147 (1995). Contrary to
for-profit corporations' assertion of the need for patents to protect their invest-
ment, U.S. taxpayers are also contributing to the HGP through funds provided to
the NIH and Department of Energy; therefore, ownership of corporate discoveries
should be in the public domain. See Annas, supra note 2, at 644; Boyle, supra note
33, at9.
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originally did most of the work associated with the project,5 private
corporations have largely taken over the project and now contribute
the most capital and make the largest number of discoveries."
In order to keep the legal and ethical issues pertaining to the HGP
current with its scientific discoveries, 5 3 the United States government
has set aside about five percent of the National Institute of Health
and Department of Energy budgets for the Ethical, Legal, and Social
Implications (ELSI) program. 4 In addition to examining the legal,
ethical, and social issues pertaining to the HGP, ELSI examines the
HGP's implications for individuals55 and develops policy options that
ensure HGP discoveries are used for the benefit of individuals and
society. 6 Thus, the United States has actively involved itself in the
HGP since its genesis in 1988.
C. INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS
The HGP remains an international effort, however, with twenty-
six countries involved in the project.5 ' After the United States in-
51. See Cook-Deegan, supra note 23, at 97 (explaining that the HGP "was
borne of technology, grew into a science bureaucracy in the U.S. and throughout
the world and is now being transformed into a hybrid academic and commercial
enterprise").
52. See id. (stating that "[t]he next phase of the project promises to veer more
sharply toward commercial application").
53. See Thomson, supra note 2, at 56 (stating that the actual discoveries arising
from the HGP progress far more rapidly than decisions dealing with the ethical,
legal, and social implications of the discoveries).
54. See id.
55. See Thomson, supra note 2, at 56. One example of research conducted by
the ELSI program is the examination of the societal implications for "carrier"
genes, in which the individual is carrying a gene for a disease but does not actually
suffer any particular ailment associated with the gene and merely passes the gene
on to the individual's offspring. See id. For example, even if an individual does not
develop a disease, that individual can still experience insurance discrimination, due
to the presence of the gene in their genetic makeup. See id. at 62. Another example
of ELSI's research focuses on the lack of predictability of diseases found through
genetic screening. See id. at 59. Because of the complexity of genes, even if an ab-
normality in the gene is not present, the individual can still get the disease. See id.
For example, only one in 200 women has the gene for breast cancer, but one in
eight or nine women develop breast cancer. See id. Therefore, a woman can obtain
a negative genetic screening result but still get breast cancer. See id.
56. See id. at 55-56.
57. See Smith & Kettelberger, supra note 3, at 48; Cook-Deegan, supra note
23, at 110 (stating that scientists in the Canada, the European Community, Latin
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volvement with the HGP, France,58 the United Kingdom,59 Japan,
60
and Germany6 have expended the most time, money, and scientific
resources on the HGP.62 In order to coordinate these efforts, the par-
ticipating countries established the Human Genome Organization
(HUGO), which consists of 239 consultants from twenty-three coun-
tries.6 3 Other international venues have also discussed the controver-
sial nature of the HGP.' Since the inception of the HGP, the interna-
America, Japan, and the United States are involved in the project).
58. The French government has awarded $13.3 million U.S. dollars to French
genome scientists. See Smith & Kettelberger, supra note 3, at 32-33. In the spirit
of international cooperation, Gerethon, a private research group in France, donated
the genome discoveries from its human genomic DNA libraries to the United Na-
tions for international distribution. See id
59. The United Kingdom began its genome project in 1989, with an allocation
of U.S. $16.5 million. See id at 33-34. It has created an extensive DNA probe
bank to give researchers worldwide free access to known probes. See id The major
focus of the United Kingdom's research has been the creation of DNA libraries
and mapping and sequencing cDNA clones. See id For further discussion regard-
ing the cDNA approach, see supra note 27 and accompanying text.
60. The Japanese government has allocated $1.7 million annually for genome
research. See id at 34-35. Its major focus has been developing and improving in-
strumentation and techniques for automated DNA sequencing. See id.
61. Germany has mainly concentrated its efforts on the study of genetically-
inherited disorders, because it is wary of the ethical issues related to predictive
testing for genetic disease and possible eugenic abuses arising from the HGP. See
id. at 35.
62. See id at 32.
63. The basic purpose of the Human Genome Organization (HUGO) is to fos-
ter coordination of research and collaboration between countries, although HUGO
is also interested in encouraging discussion about the ethical, social, legal, and
commercial issues surrounding the project. See id at 37; Cook-Deegan, sipra note
23, at 111. Although HUGO does not have any formal decision-making powers, its
decisions and recommendations carry moral weight. See Kirby, supra note 1, at 9.
Indeed, HUGO does not pass judgement on ethical issues associated with the Hu-
man Genome Project. See id
64. For example, in May, 1993, a Spanish research institute sponsored a con-
ference in Bilbao, Spain, in order to explore the ethical issues surrounding the
HGP. See Kirby, supra note 1, at 2. Topics included: the right to confidentiality in
the use of an individual's genetic information, the issues surrounding patenting of
parts of the genome, and the availability of legal limitations on genetic experi-
mentation that the human community deems unacceptable or shocking. See id. at
16. Other topics included: issues surrounding the use of DNA to determine a
criminal defendant's guilt, the implications of the HGP for insurance discrimina-
tion, the legal aspects of using DNA as an accurate and universal human identifier,
and the issues surrounding employer's knowledge about employee susceptibility to
genetically-inherited diseases. See id.
Another example of a forum for international discussion about the ethical im-
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tional community has emphasized collaboration and has opposed ef-
forts to patent the human genome.65
II. THE CONTROVERSY OVER PATENTING OF
THE HUMAN GENOME
Of all of the disputes regarding the HGP, none is more divisive
than the dispute over whether genome sequences should be pat-
ented,66 and who should have ownership rights over the genome.67
This debate is most clearly manifested in the differing approaches of
the developed and less developed countries regarding patent rights.68
A. DEFINITION AND BACKGROUND OF PATENT RIGHTS
In order to understand the essence of the controversy over patent-
ing genome sequences, it is important to first understand the property
implications of patents in general. If the United States federal gov-
ernment gives a patent to an inventor, it essentially gives the inventor
exclusive property rights, namely the right to exclude all others from
making, selling, or using the invention for a fixed period of time.6' A
plications of the HGP is the United Nations Educational, Social, and Cultural Or-
ganisation (UNESCO). See id. at 10. Although UNESCO has not been as actively
involved in procedural aspects of the HGP as the Bilbao Conference, it has stimu-
lated regional and national discussions pertaining to ethical and legal issues. See
id.
65. See Smith & Kettelberger, supra note 3, at 63 (noting that the greatest
threat is the loss of cooperation). For further discussion regarding emphasis on in-
ternational collaboration, see supra note 63 and accompanying text.
66. See Patricia Kahn, Sequencers Split Over Data Release, SCIENCE, Mar. 29,
1996, at 2 (explaining that international coordination of sequencing is a far easier
issue than data release and patent issues).
67. See id.
68. For example, less developed countries are opposed to patenting genetic
material because they believe it reduces life to a commodity. See David R.
Downes, New Diplomacy for the Biodiversity Trade, 4 TouRo J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1,
4 (1993). For a more complete discussion of the differing views of developed and
less developed countries regarding patent rights, see infra notes 130-142 and ac-
companying text.
69. See Lizzi, supra note 11, at 3 02-03; Day, supra note 7, at Fl (explaining
that patents give a company "the right to use the genetic information to make-or
to sell the rights to make-diagnostic tests or therapeutic drugs based on the in-
formation"). This period of time in the United States was extended from seventeen
to twenty years. See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (a)(2) (1994); Lizzi, supra note 11, at 303
n.33.
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patent essentially gives its owner a monopoly over the invention
during that time.70 The decision to patent an invention is thus an eco-
nomic one, enabling its owner to profit without risk of competition.7'
In order for an applicant to receive a patent, an invention must be
useful, novel, and non-obvious.2 For an invention to be "novel,"
other people cannot have used it or known about it prior to its inven-
tion by the individual attempting to claim the patent." The "non-
obviousness" requirement means that the invention cannot be evi-
dent to another person skilled in the same field as that of the inven-
tion.74
Lastly, an invention must be "useful" in order to be patented.75 An
object's usefulness lies in its ability to achieve some desired, specific
result.76 The Supreme Court held in Brenner v. Manson,77 a pioneer-
ing patent case, that in order to be patented, an item must have "sub-
stantial utility" or "confer a specific benefit ...in its currently
available form."7 Thus, granting patents for products with no known
utility "may confer power to block off whole areas of scientific de-
velopment."7 9 Discoveries that have no use except for further ex-
perimentation, therefore, can not be patented.80
One major contention regarding patenting human genome se-
quences is the claim that partial gene sequences, or Expressed Se-
quence Tags (ESTs) are neither novel, nor new."1 Researchers do not
70. Lizzi, supra note 11, at 303.
71. See Looney, supra note 5, at 233 (explaining that patents "serve a primarily
economic function").
72. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103; Lizzi, supra note 11, at 303-04; Hamett, supra
note 11, at 157; see also Smith & Kettelberger, supra note 3, at 52 (discussing the
three factors of usefulness, novelty and non-obviousness); Borson, supra note 2, at
469-75.
73. See Lizzi, supra note 11, at 303-04.
74. See id at 304.
75. See Borson, supra note 2, at 469.
76. See id.
77. 383 U.S. 519 (1966).
78. See id. at 534-35.
79. See id. at 534; see also Carroll, supra note 13, at 2452.
80. Indeed, the Court in Brenner held that "A patent is not a hunting license. It
is not a reward for the search, but compensation for its successful conclusion." 383
U.S. 519, 534-35; see Borson, supra note 2, at 480.
81. See Matthew Erramouspe, Comment, Staking Patent Claims on the Human
Blueprint: Rewards and Rent-Dissipating Races, 43 UCLA L. REv. 961, 991
(1996) (stating that "the DNA sequences constituting the human genome exist
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invent human genome sequences, but merely discover facets present
in each cell of every human being.
81
Opponents of gene patenting also argue that gene patents on
partial sequences are not useful because they have no function on
their own, 83 in that partial sequences do not code for any specific
protein.'
B. U.S. ACTIONS IN PATENTING THE GENOME
Companies in the United States began applying for patents for
partial sequences of the genome in 1991.85 The National Institutes of
Health (NIH) applied for the first patent 6 on behalf of Dr. Craig
Venter, a former employee of the NIH. 7 The NIH involved itself in
naturally in every cell of every human being, irrespective of the inventive efforts
of those who might seek to patent them"). Others argue that ESTs are new, be-
cause they involve separating out the junk DNA from the protein-producing genes
to create cDNA, from which scientists then derive ESTs. See Borson, supra note 2,
at 465. It is questionable, however, whether this process sufficiently creates an en-
tity different enough from a naturally-occurring gene to consider it patentable. See
Erramouspe, supra, at 989 (arguing that a patent should not be issued for an in-
vention that merely isolates a "common substance with well-known properties").
82. See Letters, The Human Genome Project and Patents, 254 SCIENCE 1710
(1992) (quoting Hubert Curien's statement that "[a] patent should not be granted
for something that is part of our universal heritage").
83. See Smith & Kettelberger, supra note 3, at 51. Indeed, the PTO rejected
Dr. Craig Venter's original patent applications with the NIH for the very reason
that the only use for the partial sequences was further research. See Harnett, supra
note 11, at 157-58. For further discussion regarding Venter's patent applications
with the NIH, see infra notes 85-89 and accompanying text.
84. See Smith & Kettelberger, supra note 3, at 52. On the other hand, private
interests argue that these partial sequences are useful on their own because they
provide the means for genetic markers, forensic identification, and tissue typing.
See Hamett, supra note 11, at 154. The advocates of patenting argue that the nov-
elty of the sequences lies in what they express, not necessarily their existence. See
id.
85. See Smith & Kettelberger, supra note 3, at 46.
86. See id. Experts expressed concerns about the United States government's
divided allegiance arising from its own applications for gene patents, which con-
flicts with its duty to regulate patents. See Lizzi, supra note 11, at 301. This di-
vided allegiance raises Constitutional problems because it enables the government
to "first acquire the exclusive rights to a vital technology and then to dispense
those rights to persons or entities which are in its favor." Id.
87. See Smith & Kettelberger, supra note 3, at 46. Mr. Venter perceived the
HGP not as an internationally coordinated effort, but as a fantastic gene race of
great commercial value. See id.
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the patent process through the Federal Technology Transfer Act
(FTTA), an act that the Reagan administration designed to foster the
creation of more advanced technology through collaboration between
government researchers and private industry.' The NIH wanted to
ensure these patents to secure the United States' economic strength
in the global biotechnology industry. 9 Since that time, the NIH has
filed applications for over 2,750 partial DNA sequences,90 and the
U.S. Patent and Trade Office (PTO) has issued several patents to
companies for genes.91
C. INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON PATENTING THE GENOME
The international community was outraged when the NIH filed an
application to patent partial sequences of the genome because there is
an implicit agreement that countries share their scientific discoveries
and provide good-faith efforts to initiate this sharing of research.'
The international community's position, articulated through HUGO,
is that in order to be successful, the project must be an international
collaboration, in which all countries involved share their discoveries
and information.93 In accordance with this goal, many countries are
88. See Harnett, supra note 11, at 151-52. The F1TA provides financial incen-
fives for government researchers to transfer technology to the private sector. See
id President Reagan implemented this act due to a stated effort to "put technology
to work for the taxpayers that paid for it." Id. Ironically, however, the NIH's pat-
ent applications have the opposite effect by excluding property rights from the
public domain and putting them exclusively in the hands of corporations. See id at
156. Indeed, critics characterize the NIH's action as troublesome because it was
driven by the commercial concerns of its private sector collaborations instead of
being motivated by concerns for the health of the American people. See id
89. See Looney, supra note 5, at 232.
90. See Smith & Kettelberger, supra note 3, at 46.
91. See id In September 1996, the Patent and Trade Office (PTO) issued a pat-
ent to Human Genome Sciences in Rockville, Maryland for the gene of inflam-
matory protein gamma, a protein that the immune cells normally secrete, and
which regulates the development of blood cells. See Charles W. Henderson, Blood
Weekly, Sep. 30, 1996, available in VL10470760. This patent was the fourth is-
sued to Human Genome Sciences. See id
92. See Smith & Kettelberger, supra note 3, at 47-48 (noting that "condemna-
tion of the NIH patent applications was almost universal" on both economic and
ethical grounds).
93. See Daniel McKay, Comment, Patent Law and Human Genome Research
at the Crossroads: The Need for Congressional Action, 10 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 465, 490 (stating that, according to the American
Society of Human Genetics, HUGO's position is that the HGP should not be based
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distributing the results of their research to publicly accessible com-
puter networks.94 These countries expressed their frustration and
noted the irony that the United States, which founded the HGP and
emphasized the need for international collaboration, 9 sponsored pat-
ent applications only a few years later. Ironically, the country that
founded the HGP inadvertently angered the very countries whose
help the United States requires to complete the project.96
Some countries, however, are starting to individually patent gene
on who can own the largest piece but on international collaboration); Cook-
Deegan, supra note 23, at 112-13; Carroll, supra note 13, at 2493 (stating that
HGP should involve international collaboration); see also Smith & Kettelberger,
supra note 3, at 63 (explaining that "[t]he greatest threat to the success of a
worldwide human genome project is loss of cooperation between nations and labo-
ratories engaged in such an endeavor").
In February, 1996, participants of the International Strategy Meeting on the
Human Genome Sequencing unanimously endorsed this position by stating that all
information derived from the genome should be "freely available and in the public
domain in order to encourage research and development and to maximise its bene-
fit to society." David R. Bentley, Genomic Sequence Information Should be Re-
leased Immediately and Freely in the Public Domain, 274 SCIENCE 533, 533
(1996). HUGO is very concerned about recent efforts to patent gene sequences.
See Looney, supra note 5, at 243. HUGO is concerned that these attempts would
have an "inhibitory effect on research and should not be used in a way that may
prevent others from following similar lines of research." HUMAN GENOME
ORGANIZATION, ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT:
INTERNATIONAL ISSUES 10, 11 (1992). See also Looney, supra note 5, at 243. The
writers of the Bilbao Declaration expressed a similar concern, stating that "it
would be a travesty of justice if [the Human Genome Project's] benefits were not
to be made available to all human beings in every country." BBV Foundation,
Bilbao Declaration, para. 8 (1993); Looney, supra note 5, at 243.
94. See Pamela Sherwood, Novelty in a Sea of Sequences, BIOVENTURE VIEW,
Oct. 1996, 10, 10 (explaining methods inventors utilize for distributing results via
computer database). France continually donates the sequence information from its
DNA libraries to the United Nations for distribution. See Smith & Kettelberger,
supra note 3, at 32-33 (noting that France has been a major contributor of research
since 1984). This public dissemination poses a direct threat to the proprietary in-
terests of biotechnology companies because the more results that are made avail-
able to the public, the more threatened the proprietary interests of biotechnology
companies hoping to claim rights to gene sequences become. See Sherwood, su-
pra, at 10.
95. Smith & Kettleberger, supra note 3, at 63. The United States initially dem-
onstrated its acknowledgment of the need for international collaboration in a Con-
gressional report that recognized the need for international unity in the project, but
in the years since, two administrations allowed the NIH to pursue a policy that is
"diametrically opposed" to cooperation. See id. at 63-64.
96. See id. at 63.
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sequences. These nation-states are not only responding to United
States actions, but also promulgating a defensive effort to protect
their investments.97 Thus, because the patenting of the genome has
had a snowball effect, with countries only patenting their discoveries
because other countries have done so, it has become necessary for the
United Nations or another international body to implement interna-
tional regulation on patenting gene sequences.98 At present, however,
private companies are racing at breakneck speed to patent their dis-
coveries due to the lack of regulations.
D. COMPANIES' ARGUMENTS CONCERNING PATENTING
The private research companies seeking patents for genome se-
quences justify their efforts in several ways. First, they argue that the
only incentive for entities to undertake the extensive research re-
quired to find the genome sequence information, and to attract in-
vestors, is to allow them to make a profit.99 Therefore, in order to be
profitable, firms must have the ability to apply for patent rights to
97. British researchers estimate that approximately one percent of all human
genes have been patented. See id Regarding Japan, one survey shows that Japa-
nese drug and chemical companies actually have the most patents on genome se-
quences, with approximately half of the 900 privately-held gene patents world-
wide. See id; see Robert Langreth, Japan is Leading Race to Patent Genes of
Humans, WALL ST. J., Apr. 4, 1996, at B6. The study found that seven of the top
thirteen gene patenting companies are Japanese. See id Great Britain also has ap-
plied for patents through its Medical Research Council (MRC). See Smith & Ket-
telberger, supra note 3, at 33. Great Britain acknowledges, however, that its ac-
tions are only in response to patenting efforts of other countries and that it will
only continue to patent genes if other countries do so as well. See id. at 48. MRC
attempted to further pressure NIH to withdraw its patent application by stating that
if the NIH withdraws its patent applications, MRC will do so as well. See id
98. See Smith & Kettelberger, supra note 3, at 48 (noting that the lack of coop-
eration among nations may prove to be detrimental to the genome effort, which
relies so heavily on shared information).
99. See Looney, supra note 5, at 242 (noting that investors will not invest in
genome research without the guarantee of patent protection and the corresponding
commercial reward). Reid Adler, Director of the NIH's Office of Technology
Transfer, argued that if the partial sequence of the genome was published, the en-
tire sequence would become part of the public domain. See Smith & Kettelberger,
supra note 3, at 47. He stated that "if everything goes into the public domain there
is much less incentive to invest time and money in developing a product. Our con-
cern was to protect the invention early enough to give meaningful patent protec-
tion to companies that might seek a license from NIH." Leslie Roberts, Top HHS
Lawyer Seeks to Block NIH, 258 SCIENCE 184, 186 (1991).
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their discoveries."0
This profit, however, does not necessarily need to include pat-
ent rights to the genome sequences themselves. Indeed, the purpose
of the HGP is to formulate drugs to treat diseases, and these drugs
would be a new creation;' 0 l thus, patent rights would attach to drugs
derived from the sequences. 12 Researchers can even obtain patent
rights to the processes by which they discover genes. 103 Some com-
mentators argue that, contrary to their representations, corporations
do not have to lay out millions of dollars to sequence ESTs, but that
sequencing an EST only takes a few dollars and a few minutes of an
automated sequencer's time."
Companies argue that this incentive-oriented motivation would
help to accomplish the HGP at a much faster rate, as entities seek to
reap their rewards through patenting. 105 This argument is weakened,
however, when considered in conjunction with: the complex and un-
certain nature of the genome sequences, 6 the enormous backlog of
patents in the PTO,'07 and the possible overlap in sequences which
100. See Looney, supra note 5, at 242; Smith & Kettelberger, supra note 3, at
46-47; Borson, supra note 2, at 476-77; Neil Gross & John Carey, Who Owns the
Tree of Life?, Bus. WK., Nov. 4, 1996, at 194, 196. Biotechnology patents are now
an extraordinarily lucrative enterprise in the United States. Major drug companies
sign multi-million dollar contracts with genome companies for the right to market
drugs produced from the genes. See Jeff Nesbit, No One Should Hold a Patent on
Humans, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1996, at B8-9. Microsoft billionaire Bill Gates
and an unnamed partner invested ten million dollars in a small genome company,
with hopes that they will strike "human DNA gold." See id. In one survey, drug
companies estimated that companies would not have developed approximately 60
percent of pharmaceutical products, had they not been able to patent their discov-
eries. See Borson, supra note 2, at 477. This patenting, however, would only ex-
tend to the products, not the genes from which the products were derived. See id.
101. See Borson, supra note 2, at 477.
102. See id. (stating that most drugs would not have been developed if patents
had not been issued for them.)
103. See Erramouspe, supra note 81, at 996 (explaining that the Amgen court
found that gene patents essentially apply to a company's discovery of a gene
through a non-obvious method). Thus, "the true 'invention' is not the gene itself
but rather the method used to obtain the gene." 1d.
104. See id. at 483.
105. See Harnett, supra note 11, at 155-56 (discussing the NIH's fear that if it
did not file patent applications for Venter's gene sequences, drug companies might
be disinclined to conduct the research necessary to market important drugs).
106. See Looney, supra note 5, at 244.
107. See Eliot Marshall, Patent Office Faces 90-Year Backlog, SCIENCE, May 3,
[13:219238
PROPERTY RIGHTS TO THE HUMAN GENOME
makes potential investors hesitant to lay out capital, fearing that the
sequence may already be claimed under another patent.'
Research firms also assert that, contrary to popular belief, patents
help to keep information within the public purview because the pub-
lic must make use of the patented product in order for the company
to make a profit.0 9 If the firms cannot patent their discoveries, the
argument continues, they will not be inclined to disclose their dis-
coveries to the public and would instead hoard their findings."0
Although this argument has merit on a theoretical level, it is not
necessarily accurate, because the public cannot make practical use of
the genetic sequences in their raw form, the form in which they are
patented, but only in the form of a drug formulated to interact with
the particular gene."' In addition, companies tend to keep their in-
1993, at 30. To grant a patent, the PTO must check each named sequence in a pat-
ent application against all existing patents in order to show that a particular se-
quence is unique. See id. The finances required to check a particular patent are ex-
orbitant: although the PTO receives a $1,000 filing fee for each patent application,
the cost of the up-to-date computer equipment necessary to analyze the sequence,
combined with other factors such as salaries of scientists, totals approximately
$200,000 per application. See id. (explaining that, although companies have filed
only 100 large DNA applications, PTO experts estimate that it will take more than
$20 million and an entire century to process these applications). Moreover, in or-
der to take advantage of the $1,000 filing fee, companies tend to jam as many as
5,000 DNA sequences into each patent application. See id. (noting that Incyte puts
as many as 5,000 sequences into every application). In order to pay for the high
costs of securing genome patents, the PTO is considering taxing the universe of
patent applicants despite the fact that some PTO officials think this would be un-
fair. See id.
108. For example, one biotechnology lawyer exclaimed," [w]hat if the gene
turns out to be linked to another gene that the French have licensed?.. .I'm not
going to invest a million dollars with that kind of uncertainty." Looney, supra note
5, at 244 (citing Christopher Anderson, US Patent Application Stirs Up Gene
Hunters, 353 NATURE 485, 486 (1991)).
109. See Nurses' Frustration with System Often Well-Placed (National Public
Radio broadcast, Oct. 20, 1996) available in 1996 WL7997589 [hereinafter
Nurses' Frustration] (explaining that the only way patent holders make a profit
from their discoveries is to widely disseminate the discovery).
110. See Borson, supra note 2, at 493-94; see also Kahn, supra note 66, at 1798-
99 (observing that following the European Union's sequencing of yeast, the re-
searchers kept the data hidden for months in order to personally benefit from its
proceeds).
111. See Nurses' Frustration, supra note 109. Francis Collins, head of the Na-
tional Center for Human Genome Research at the NIH, said that he fears that pat-
ents for raw genetic material will inhibit further research on the genome. See id;
Biotechnology Development and Patent lnv: Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual
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formation secret until they receive a patent. As noted above, this pro-
cess could take many years due to the uncertainty created by over-
lapping sequences.' 2 Indeed, because the ESTs do not define the
function of a gene, but only the gene's approximate location within
the sequence, a patent of the EST encourages the company to hoard
the sequence as opposed to making it available to others for further
research.' For these reason many commentators believe that grant-
ing patents to partial sequences inhibits progress of the HGP as a
whole."
14
Property and Judicial Admin. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong.,
1S Sess. 11, 13 (1991) [hereinafter Biotechnology Development] (prepared state-
ment of Bernadine Healy, M.D., Director, National Institutes of Health) (stating
that the patent process may serve to hinder free scientific exchange); see Carroll,
supra note 13, at 2481 (stating that legal professionals, economists, and scientists
argue that patents hamper the progress of the HGP).
112. See Industry-Linked Groups, Geneticists Hoard Data. Research Groups
Linked to Industry and Those in Genetics Delay Publishing Data More Than Oth-
ers, NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY, June 1, 1997, at 504 [hereinafter Industry-Linked
Groups]. There are also indications that this "hoarding" of information does not
occur absent patent protection, but that even if companies do not obtain patents on
their expressed sequence tags (ESTs), they will still disseminate the information.
See Borson, supra note 2, at 491. One example of such sharing of information is
the collaboration between Human Genome Sciences (HGS) and the Johns Hopkins
School of Medicine, in which they jointly discovered the gene that causes colon
cancer. See id, at 492. In this process of discovery, neither party patented the gene.
See id.
113. See Harnett, supra note 11, at 161 (explaining that patenting ESTs would
discourage non-licensees from further researching the partial cDNA sequences).
"Such a disincentive could have resulted in a 'meta'-monopoly', whereby a single
entity would acquire de facto dominion over the identification of 2,700 genes, their
gene products, and methods of exploiting their biological activity. Such a meta-
monopoly may run afoul of patent licensing laws and would do nothing to aid de-
velopment of useful products." Id. See Borson, supra note 2, at 494-95.
114. For example, Francis Collins, head of the National Center for Human Ge-
nome Research at the NIH, said that he fears that patents for raw genetic material
will inhibit further research on the genome. See Nurses' Frustration, supra note
109; Biotechnology Development, supra note 111 (prepared statement of
Bernadine Healy, M.D., Director, National Institutes of Health) (stating that the
patent process may serve to hinder free scientific exchange); see Carroll, supra
note 13, at 2481 (stating that legal professionals, economists, and scientists argue
that patents hamper the progress of the HGP); Mae Wan Ho et. al, Letter: Will Life
ItselfBe Up for Grabs? GUARDIAN, July 14, 1997, at 14 (explaining that "[m]uch
scientific advance depends on laboratories being willing to share information, and
this is naturally impeded if the group that puts the last piece into the jigsaw is al-
lowed to patent the discovery, as happened with the breast cancer gene, BRCA 1").
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E. AN ALTERNATIVE OUTLOOK ON PATENTING THE GENOME
In light of the new status of genome research in conjunction with
traditional patenting rights, we must not only analyze the arguments
biotech companies advocate in favor of patenting the genome, but
also consider: 1) Whether the genome indeed fits within the context
of this traditional patenting paradigm, and 2) Whether it should,
when examined in the context of public policy considerations.
In order to determine whether the genome fits within the tradi-
tional patenting paradigm, we must examine what patenting the ge-
nome entails. Applying patent rights to the genome confers owner-
ship rights on anyone who has a patent on a specific part of the
genome, allowing them to require everyone else to pay for permis-
sion to undertake further research on it." 5 Because the partial gene
sequences do not articulate the function of the gene, or specify where
the gene lies on the sequence," 6 more research-must occur in order to
make the sequence useful." 7 Patenting, therefore, inhibits necessary
further research."' Indeed, the current trend in patenting genomes is
for corporations to patent partial sequences without knowing their
function, merely to secure their cash benefits before anyone else
can.! 9 One scientist likened the genome race to the "quick and dirty
grab" of the American frontier.22 This trend, however, is contrary to
115. See Richard Saltus, Top Scientist Urges Shortcut on Gene-Mapping Re-
search, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 7, 1997, at A8.
116. See Borson, supra note 2, at 481.
117. See id
118. See Saltus, supra note 115, at A8.
119. See Gross & Carey, supra note 100, at 194 (explaining the argument that a
gene whose usefulness is unclear should not be patented). Many members of the
international community have expressed this sentiment as well. See PTO Hearings
Held on Gene Sequence Cases Patent Office Plans Hearings on Patent Protection
for Nucleic Acid Sequences, BIOPHARM, Apr. 1, 1996, at 14 [hereinafter PTO
Hearings Held]. Scientists and financiers of large-scale sequencing expressed a
similar opinion while developing guidelines for public funding of large sequencing
projects at a meeting in 1996. See Kahn, supra note 66, at 2. In an effort to secure
patents to partial sequences, some companies file patent applications with as many
as 20,000 gene fragments. See id
120. See Arthur Caplan, How Far is Too Far with Genetic Patents? TIMES
UNION (ALBANY, NY), Apr. 30, 1996, at A8 (comparing the HGP to the Oklahoma
land rush in the late 1800's). In the land rush, westward travelers were trying to
claim plots of land as quickly as possible, before other frontiersmen could lay
claims to the land. See id.
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the traditional requirement than an invention be useful in order to be
patentable. 121
In addition to failing the utility requirement, patent rights do not
necessarily attach to these sequences because the researchers have
not created anything new, but have merely indicated generally where
the gene might lie on a naturally occurring sequence. 22 Moreover,
companies are not only obtaining property rights to a substance in
every cell of our bodies, they are getting this benefit without be-
stowing any immediate knowledge on society in return.
Simply examining the patentability of the human genome in a tra-
ditional patenting context, however, does not consider vital aspects
of the HGP, including the intent for international collaboration on the
HGP,"' the fact that the human genome is technically owned by
every person, 124 and the position of many governments that patenting
the human genome is morally wrong because it reduces life to a
commodity.125 Moreover, as a practical matter, by patenting parts of
the genome, corporations are attempting to take possession of what is
not wholly theirs. The United States government partially funds the
HGP, and, accordingly, any results derived from the HGP belong
partly to U.S. taxpayers, and not solely to private corporations. 26
Because the HGP has become a fixture primarily in the corporate
world, companies have become focused on the goal of making a
121. For further discussion of the patent requirement that an invention be useful,
see supra notes 72-80 and accompanying text.
122. See Borson, supra note 2, at 476 (explaining that, although some argue that
our genes should belong to everyone, biotechnology companies are interested in
claiming ownership rights to genes.)
123. See Carroll, supra note 13, at 2493. For further discussion regarding the
intent of international collaboration, see supra note 65 and accompanying text.
124. See Letters, supra note 82, at 1710 (quoting French Minister for Research
and Technology Hubert Curien's statement that "[a] patent should not be granted
for something that is part of our universal heritage"). For further discussion re-
garding the argument that the human genome belongs to all people, see infra notes
165-172 and accompanying text.
125. For further discussion on the views of developing countries, see infra notes
130-140 and accompanying text.
126. See Boyle, supra note 33, at 9; Annas, supra note 2, at 644. Recent discus-
sion within the PTO examining the possibility of underwriting these costs through
all applications submitted to the PTO shows that researching gene sequences is
very costly, regardless of their nature. See PTO Hearings Held, supra note 119, at
14. The underwriting of these costs by all individuals seeking a patent would also
raise the issue of to whom the genome sequence patents should belong. See id.
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profit and have failed to take into account the larger realm of scien-
tific discovery. For example, when corporations claim that they re-
quire patents as a reward for the amount of effort invested in their re-
search, they demonstrate complete disinterest in furthering scientific
knowledge as the ends of their efforts. This clear insistence on
monetary rewards contrasts starkly with the efforts of Watson and
Crick.127 When Watson and Crick discovered the double-helical
structure of DNA in 1953, they refused to patent the structure, de-
spite the fact that they would have undoubtedly made millions of
dollars from it.'28 Moreover, corporations' emphasis on patents as the
sole way to expedite the process of the HGP does not consider alter-
native funding sources.'29 Consequently, if the international commu-
nity allows corporations to make decisions regarding property rights
of the human genome, the decision will be based on economic prin-
ciples, and will fail to take other important factors into consideration.
F. DEVELOPING COUNTRIES' POSITION ON PATENTING
The greatest disparity over who should have property rights to the
human genome lies between developed countries 3 ' and less devel-
127. See Kirby, supra note 1, at 17.
128. See id Watson was so opposed to the concept of patenting the genome that
he resigned as Director of the Human Genome Project in protest of the NIH's
original patent application. See Carroll, supra note 13, at 2436 n. 19 (citing Robin
Herman, The Great Gene Gold Rush, US. Rankles Other Countries with Preemp-
tive Strike in the Race to Patent Human Genes, WASH. POST, June 16, 1992,
(Health) at 11). Watson and other critics have assailed this filing of patents as "a
land grab, a preemptive strike that would promote a worldwide stampede to garner
patents on essentially meaningless pieces ofDNA.. .it would foster secrecy among
scientists, destroy the essential-and fragile-international relations on which the
Genome Project depends, and hamstring the biotech industry." Leslie Roberts,
NIH Gene Patents, Round Two, 255 SCIENCE 912 (1992). When French scientists
completed the first physical map of the genome, an accomplishment that has been
compared to Watson and Crick's discovery of DNA, they chose not to patent the
map despite the prospect of significant financial rewards. See Looney, supra note
5, at 231-32.
129. For example, in order to derive the funding necessary for their mapping of
the genome, the French CEPH scientists sponsored a genome research telethon, in
which they personally participated. See Looney, supra note 5, at 242 (citing Clive
Cookson, Gene Map a Major Breakthrough, FIN. PoST, Dec. 23, 1993, at 38).
Some argue, however, that financing efforts such as these are not substantial
enough to sequence the entire genome. See id at 242.
130. Developed countries are generally "technology-rich . . . northern coun-
tries." Carroll, supra note 13, at 2440. Developed countries have an incentive to
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oped countries ("LDCs").13 ' Less developed countries have not
placed much of an emphasis on patent systems because LDCs tend to
place less importance on individual property rights.'32 Less devel-
oped countries, therefore, view intellectual property as a community
asset and believe that individuals should not own rights to something
which "belongs in the public domain." 133 Moreover, LDCs have tra-
ditionally had reservations about intellectual property rights because
they perceive intellectual property as confined to colonial govern-
ments and multinational corporations. 134 LDCs view colonial gov-
ernments as depriving them of their rights, instead of granting them
additional ones. 13' LDCs have traditionally been skeptical of the in-
ternational transfer of technologies from developed countries to
lesser developed countries in order to improve the infrastructure of
the LDCs.'36 The LDCs feel that developed countries are only inter-
ested in profit, and are therefore in a superior position from which to
dictate the terms of technology transfers. 137
Among this background of patenting, LDCs are especially wary of
the ability to patent human genetic material. 38 LDCs believe that the
patent their genome discoveries because they have invested money in the HGP and
want to advance their economic standing internationally. See id. at 2439.
131. Developing countries tend to be "less prosperous, southern countries."
Carroll, supra note 13, at 2464. The term "developing countries" is used inter-
changeably in this paper with the terms "less developed countries" or "LDCs."
These countries tend to be economically poorer. See id. For further discussion of
LDCs' position on patenting the human genome, see infra notes 130-140 and ac-
companying text.
132. See Boyle, supra note 33, at 193. Professor Boyle makes this point in his
Bellagio Declaration by stating:
Contemporary intellectual property law is constructed around the notion of the author ... and
original creator, and it is for this figure that its protections are reserved. Those who do not fit this
model-custodians of tribal culture and medical knowledge, collectives practicing traditional ar-
tistic and musical forms, or peasant cultivators of valuable seed varieties, for example-are de-
nied intellectual property protection.
..In general, systems built around the author paradigm tend to obscure or undervalue the
importance of "the public domain," the intellectual and cultural commons from which future
works will be constructed. Each intellectual property right, in effect, fences off some portion of
the public domain, making it unavailable to future creators.
Boyle, supra note 33, at 193-94.
133. Carroll, supra note 13, at 2465.
134. See id.
135. See id.
136. See id. at 2466.
137. See id.
138. See Carroll, supra note 13, at 2466; see also Gross & Carey, supra note
100, at 196 (explaining that many religious organizations have embraced Biotech-
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patenting of genetic material reduces human life to a commodity and
amounts to tampering with nature. 9 LDCs have recently become
more attuned to this dilemma as a result of the developed countries'
discovery of a harvest of genetic resources in LDC populations. 4 '
Developed countries consider these genes unique because LDCs tend
to be in remote areas, and remote populations tend to be immune
from certain diseases that affect the rest of the world. 4' Although
scientists claim that the tribes consent to the patenting and are enti-
tled to receive royalties from their cells, Third World empathizers
claim that these actions are evidence of " genetic colonialism." '42
III. APPLICATION OF THE COMMON HERITAGE
PRINCIPLE TO THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT
A. TRADITIONAL APPLICATIONS OF THE COMMON HERITAGE
CONCEPT
The Common Heritage of Mankind principle is an international
legal concept which conveys equal property interests to all people.43
nology opponent Jeremy Rifkin and his "crusade" against patenting genetic mate-
rial). Last year, LDCs became upset by W.R. Grace's patenting of a bio-friendly
pesticide made from seeds of the neem tree. See id at 195. Asian Indians have
long used these seeds as a natural pesticide, and therefore feel that W.R. Grace &
Co. stole their intellectual property. See id
139. See Downes, supra note 68, at 4-5 (recognizing the argument against
"biotechnological commercialization of biodiversity" due to the fact that it leads
to tampering with nature).
140. See Gross & Carey, supra note 100, at 194 (explaining the importance of
genetic discoveries made in LDCs).
141. See id (discussing the unique genetic attributes of the Hagahai, a primitive
tribe living in the remote forests of New Guinea). The Hagahai were infected with
a disease that usually causes leukemia, but members of the tribe did not get sick.
See id Scientists drew blood from tribal members, and then attempted to patent it.
See id Another example of this type of exploitation is the U.S. government's pat-
ent application for the cells of a Panamanian Guaymi woman. See John Frow, El-
vis's Fame: The Commodity Form and the Form of the Person, 7 CARDOZO STUD.
L. & LITERATURE 131, 150 (1994). Panamanian Guaymi women carry the Human
T-Lymphotropic Virus without any harm to themselves. See id The tribe had,
however, placed a ban on the taking of blood samples for the purpose of patenting.
See id
142. See Gross & Carey, supra note 100, at 194. This patenting has made LDC
health authorities reluctant to cooperate with genomic companies. See id.
143. See Ellen S. Tenenbaum, Note, A World Park in Antarctica: The Common
Heritage of Mankind, 10 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 109, 112 (1990) (stating that the Com-
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Less developed countries have embraced the Common Heritage con-
cept 4 as the embodiment of the combination of customary interna-
tional law withjus cogens status.'45 The Common Heritage doctrine
includes four characteristics: 1) no country can appropriate for itself
the territory in question; 2) all states share responsibility for manag-
ing the territory; 146 3) all states share in the benefits from exploitation
of the territory or its resources; and 4) all countries must use the ter-
ritory for exclusively peaceful purposes. 147 In addition, legal bodies
sometimes include a fifth characteristic, that all countries have a
shared responsibility for preserving the unique or irreplaceable re-
sources of the territory in question for future generations. 4 The
Common Heritage concept is unpopular with developed countries
that do not agree with its goal of redistributing resources to less de-
mon Heritage of Mankind essentially provides that no private interest or country
can appropriate designated property and that all states must share in its manage-
ment and benefits). Frederico Mayer, Director General of UNESCO, explains the
importance of the Common Heritage concept: "We are at a pivotal moment in
history in the march from oppression to liberty. The only heritage that remains
whole and which we all share is the future, but to realize its promise we must have
the memory of our past." Howard LaFranchi, Saving Places of Unique Impor-
tance, A UNESCO Program Works to Preserve the Sites of Mankind's Common
Heritage, CHRISTIAN SCI. MON., July 23, 1992, at 10.
144. See Tenenbaum, supra note 143, at 112 (stating that the "common heritage
of mankind [sic] is the legal embodiment of the rejection by developing nations"
of developed countries' attempts to assert property rights over land which should
not belong to any country). This concept is also an effort of less developed coun-
tries to obtain a greater role in the international arena through international law.
See id. at 114.
145. See Lt. Martin A. Harry, The Deep Seabed: The Common Heritage of
Mankind or Arena for Unilateral Exploitation?, 40 NAVAL L. REV. 207, 207-08
(1992) (stating that the Group of 77, a coalition of developing states, has taken this
position). Jus cogens is an international customary law that has attained the level
of a peremptory norm; no derogation is permitted. See Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/27 (1969), art. 53.
146. See Tenenbaum, supra note 143, at 114 (explaining that sharing responsi-
bilities and benefits implies sharing the costs of mismanagement and environmen-
tally degrading exploitation).
147. See id.
148. See id at 136 n.14 (explaining the fifth characteristic of the Common
Heritage of Mankind). The res communis doctrine states that use of territory is
shared by all people, and cannot be claimed by one state. See id. at 113-14. How-
ever, this doctrine differs from the Common Heritage principle in that res commu-
nis tends to result in overuse due to the lack of protective measures accompanying
states' ability to reap benefits from the territory. See id at 114.
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veloped countries. 4 9
The United Nations has traditionally applied the Common Heri-
tage doctrine to deep seabeds,," Antarctica,' the Moon 2 and other
149. See Tenenbaum, supra note 143, at 115; see also CHRISTOPHER C. JOYNER,
ANTARCnTCA AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 129 (1992) (stating that "[a]s a legal no-
tion, the common heritage of mankind [sic] has been shunned by the developed
states. In fact, this legal concept has been the preeminent factor dissuading West-
em industrialized governments from joining the [Law of the Sea] Convention").
The failure of states to embrace the Common Heritage concept underlines the dis-
parity between developed and developing countries and demonstrates developing
countries' need for assistance in preventing over-exploitation of resources by de-
veloped countries.
150. See Harry, supra note 145, at 207. In the past, developed countries have
attempted to exercise control over the mineral resources in the deep sea beds of the
high seas. See id at 207-08. Through the 1982 United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), Dec. 10, 1982, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62!122 (1982),
reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261, developing countries have attempted to rebuff this
control, asserting instead that, under the Common Heritage principle, no country
has sovereign rights to the seabeds and no country can unilaterally exploit the re-
sources. See Harry, supra note 145, at 208. Because the U.S. rejected the Conven-
tion, however, it is not clear whether the Common Heritage concept definitively
applies to the seabeds. See id
151. See Tenenbaum, supra note 143, at 109. The 1959 Antarctic Treaty re-
stricts uses of Antarctica to international, exclusively peaceful use "in the interest
of all mankind." The Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. No.
4780, 402 U.N.T.S. 71, preamble-art. I(1) [hereinafter 1959 Antarctic Treaty];
see also Tenenbaum, supra note 133, at 136 n.50. The Antarctic Treaty links free-
dom of scientific investigation in Antarctica, see id art. II, and international coop-
eration in scientific investigation, see id art. I(1), with a ban on nuclear testing
and dumping of radioactive waste. See id art. V(I). The treaty disallows new ter-
ritorial claims within Antarctica, although it preserves existing claims. See id at
art. IV.
Applying the Common Heritage concept to Antarctica is beneficial to the inter-
national community because it presents "the possibility that a (universal) coastal
authority might be established in the unclaimed sector," and set up circumstances
in which "application of the CHM [Common Heritage of Mankind] to one part of
the continent could set the stage for eventually applying the concept to the entire
region." JOYNER, supra note 149, at 91. The Antarctic treaty has been followed by
a series of conventions, including the Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic
Mineral Resource Activities. See Tenenbaum, supra note 143, at 118-19. This se-
ries of conventions and treaties does not, however, completely attribute the Com-
mon Heritage concept to Antarctica. See id Although the treaties preserve Antarc-
tica exclusively for peaceful purposes, they do not provide for the sharing of
resources among all countries, nor completely prohibit territorial claims. See id. at
123-24. Some commentators, however, have argued that the Common Heritage
concept has become customary international law with respect to Antarctica. These
commentators argue that Antarctica has achieved this status because the interna-
tional community has observed the original 1959 treaty for 30 years and has en-
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celestial bodies, and certain worldwide historical sites.'53 The United
Nations tends to uniformly apply the Common Heritage concept to
environmentally vulnerable sites'54 because the environment tran-
scends national borders' and is not limited to domestic sover-
eignty."' Thus, preservation of the environment can only occur
through international cooperation.'57
Judging from the similarities between traditional applications of
the Common Heritage concept and the human genome,'58 and taking
into account the grave ethical consequences of privatizing the ge-
nome, 59 the Common Heritage of Mankind should apply to the hu-
man genome.
B. APPLYING THE COMMON HERITAGE CONCEPT TO THE GENOME
DOES NOT LIMIT ANALYSIS TO CONCERN ABOUT ECONOMIC
ISSUES
As discussed earlier, 6' companies currently attempting to patent
forced the freeze on territorial claims during that period. See Tenenbaum, supra
note 143, at 117 (citing Francioni, Legal Aspects of Mineral Exploitation in Ant-
arctica, 19 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 163, 188 (1986)). Less developed countries have
advocated Antarctica's use as a world park as opposed to a mere mineral mine. See
Tenenbaum, supra, at 110.
152. See JOYNER, supra note 149, at 254.
153. See LaFranchi, supra note 143, at 10. UNESCO has attributed 358 sites in
83 countries to the World Heritage List, including the ruins of the Persepolis,
Acropolis, Independence Hall, and the Grand Canyon. See id. UNESCO's mission
is to "commemorate the natural wonders and historical sites that constitute man-
kind's common patrimony." Id. UNESCO attempts to accomplish this mission by
identifying sites of "unique and universal value," monitoring their preservation,
and aiding nations in restoring them. See id. Countries with registered sites must
commit to protecting them. See id
154. See Tenenbaum, supra note 143, at 116.
155. See Tenenbaum, supra note 143, at 116 (citing Gundling, Environment,
International Protection, 9 MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 119, 120 (1986)).
156. See id.
157. Tenenbaum, supra note 143, at 116.
158. See infra parts B and C (discussing the human genome as a frontier similar
to Antarctica and the moon, and emphasizing the need for a balance of power be-
tween developed and developing countries).
159. See supra notes 27-47 and accompanying text (discussing the potential
dangers associated with the HGP). These dangers are more likely to occur if power
over property rights to the genome is unregulated and concentrated among private
interests. See id.
160. See supra notes 99-110 and accompanying text (discussing corporations'
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the genome defend their argument primarily on economic grounds.16
A basic tenet of the Common Heritage principle is the emphasis
placed on preserving the territory for future generations rather than
focusing on economic interests. 162 Although allowing private compa-
nies to own the Moon would assumedly be profitable, the world
community agrees the Moon belongs to no one, making it possible to
share both the benefits and the responsibility of the Moon." Simi-
larly, though companies stand to profit immeasurably from the HGP,
the world community should focus instead on preserving its use for
future generations. 64
C. BECAUSE THE HUMAN GENOME IS PART OF EVERY PERSON, IT
SHOULD BELONG TO ALL HUMANITY
The human genome is literally the blueprint of humankind's
Common Heritage, because it is the manifestation of our evolution.1
65
Therefore, the human genome is a more integral part of humanity
than items that the Common Heritage principle traditionally covers,
such as the deep seabeds or Antarctica.'" The DNA structure that
each person inherits is the result of millions of years of evolution,' 67 a
natural process caused by human adaptation and development."
Allowing private companies to own our genome is like allowing
companies to own another part of the human body, such as an eye or
arguments for patenting the genome).
161. See id.
162. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
163. See OLIVER, supra note 15, at 279.
164. See Looney, supra note 5, at 234 (explaining the argument that, from an
ethical standpoint, genes are inappropriate for patenting, because they are a
"common, universal possession, representative of humankind's collective heri-
tage").
165. See Kirby, supra note 1, at 14 (quoting Watson's declaration at the Bilbao
Conference). Watson stated that genetic variation is the basis of our evolution, and
that "without the differential of survival of more fit variants, we as human beings
would not have our highly empowered brains that have led us to develop the lan-
guages... that underlie the creation of our various civilizations." See id.
166. The traditional applications of the Common Heritage Principle viewed the
item to be protected as "territory," which is "out there" in the world. See Tenen-
baum, supra note 143, at 114. The genome is different because it is not out there;
it is within each human being.
167. See supra note 165, at 14 (discussing importance of genes in evolution).
168. See id.
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nose.1 69 Moreover, if companies own property rights to the genome,
they have the rights to decide what will be done with it. 7 This
specter of private ownership carries with it the grave implications
discussed earlier in this comment,'' including insurance discrimina-
tion and eugenics."'
D. LIKE ANTARCTICA OR THE MOON, THE HUMAN GENOME IS A
NEw FRONTIER
As discussed earlier, scientists have compared the human genome
to both the Wild West of the United States and the Oklahoma terri-
tory, which companies were trying to "capture" at a frantic pace.
7 3
The world community at-large does not know enough about the ge-
nome, an integral part of human kind, to make a knowledgeable deci-
sion to give up its claim to this new frontier. As a result, very few
regulations exist concerning the genome.'75 Moreover, the basic sci-
entific discoveries concerning the genome have advanced more rap-
idly than the ethical issues arising from the genome development.'76
The project continues at the behest of scientists and corporations
with no public consent, although the results will certainly affect the
public.
177
169. See Gross & Carey, supra note 100, at 194 (comparing patenting of the ge-
nome to "patenting an eye, and charging everyone a license to see"). The Euro-
pean Union has specifically stated that the human body or parts thereof are not
patentable. See Amended Proposal for a Council Directive on the Legal Protection
of Biotechnological Inventions, 1993 O.J. (C 44) 36, 40; Looney, supra note 5, at
234.
170. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text (stating that the function of a
patent is to provide exclusive ownership rights).
171. For further discussion regarding the negatives of the HGP, see supra notes
27-47 and accompanying text.
172. See id.
173. For further discussion comparing the genome to a territorial frontier, see
supra note 150 and accompanying text.
174. For further discussion regarding the public's lack of knowledge about the
HGP, see supra notes 43-47.
175. For further discussion regarding lack of regulations, see supra note 45 and
accompanying text.
176. See Thomson, supra note 2, at 56 (stating that "when the genes are all
mapped and sequenced, we will still have a great deal of work yet to be done in the
areas of ethical, legal and social implications").
177. See Kirby, supra note 1, at 14 (explaining participants' concern at the Bil-
bao, Spain conference that the public doesn't know about the HGP, although the
results will affect them).
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E. APPLYING COMMON HERITAGE STATUS TO THE GENOME WILL
COMPLY WITH THE INTENT OF INTERNATIONAL COLLABORATION.
For the world community to benefit most effectively from the ge-
nome, the Common Heritage Principle must be applied to the HGP.
Applying this definition to the HGP would result in the following
determinations: 1) the genome could not be appropriated by any
country or private corporation within that country; 2) all states would
share responsibility for setting regulations and laws for permissible
uses of the genome; 3) all states would share in the benefits derived
from the HGP, which would mean that all gene sequences would be
publicly accessible; 4) the genome would be reserved exclusively for
peaceful use; and 5) the worldwide community would have a shared
responsibility for preserving the genome intact for future genera-
tions.17 A treaty signed by the international community granting the
HGP Common Heritage status would eliminate state concerns about
protecting their investments.
179
The application of the Common Heritage concept to the genome
would balance the interests of developed and developing countries,'
thus holding true to the traditional purpose. 8' As stated previously,
178. Indeed, throughout the HGP, many experts have asserted that the HGP
should be part of the Common Heritage. For example, Hubert Curien, the French
Minister for Research and Technology, stated that "a patent should not be granted
for something that is part of our universal heritage." Looney, supra note 5, at 237;
Smith & Kettelberger, supra note 3, at 47. Moreover, HUGO has declared that the
genome should be part of Mankind's Common Heritage. See Looney, supra, at
238-39 (stating that "the human genome is our common heritage and collective
property; genetic information is.. .in the public domain.. .human DNA is not pat-
entable, but belongs to humankind").
179. For further discussion regarding the "snowball effect" of countries patent-
ing gene sequences in a defensive reaction to U.S. patenting, see Smith & Kettel-
berger, supra note 3, at 48 (discussing the necessity for countries to share discov-
ery of genome sequences).
180. See Carroll, supra note 13, at 2493 (concluding that in order for the poten-
tial benefits of the HGP to be realized, a worldwide system protecting research
must take into account the interests of both developed and developing countries).
181. For example, with respect to the seabeds, the developing countries sought
to prevent developed countries from mining all of their minerals. See Harry, supra
note 145, at 209. The developing countries were especially concerned because
they did not have the technology to mine the seabeds, so they sought to prevent the
developed countries from taking all of the minerals before the developing coun-
tries could do their own mining. See id (discussing President Johnson's declara-
tion that the harvest of seabed minerals should not create "a new form of colonial
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most developing countries are opposed to patenting genes,' and
consider it a form of neo-colonialism." 3 Because the genome techni-
cally belongs to the citizens of LDCs to the same extent as citizens of
the developed countries, the Common Heritage Principle is necessary
to balance the property rights of both LDCs and developed country
citizens despite their different interests.
Companies may argue that, because they have already invested
millions of dollars patenting their results,"s changing property rights
is improbable at this late date.8 5 This view, however, does not take
into consideration the still-evolving understanding of whether patent
rights should apply to the genome,8 6 as well as the line between
natural and artificial processes associated with genes.8 7 Companies
seeking genome patents have taken the risk of knowingly acting
contrary to the stated purpose of HUGO, which provides that the re-
sults of the HGP shall be shared internationally.' 8 Moreover, due to
the complexity of the genome, U.S. companies are having a difficult
time determining if other countries have patented aspects of the exact
same sequences.8 9 The companies, therefore, would have little basis
for complaining if the international community enacted guidelines in
accordance with its stated intention to make the HGP part of Human-
kind's Common Heritage.
competition among the maritime nations").
182. For further discussion regarding developing countries' objections to pat-
enting genes, see supra notes 130-142 and accompanying text.
183. See id.
184. See Human Genome Sciences Inc., supra note 8, at A9.
185. See Borson, supra note 2, at 476-77; for further discussion regarding com-
panies' investments in the HGP, see supra notes 99-105 and accompanying text.
186. See Borson, supra note 2, at 495 (stating that the legitimate aim to develop
products for human therapy has led to the "premature" filing of patent applica-
tions).
187. See Devinder Sharma, The Human Body Shop, BUSINESS LINE (THE
HINDU), Aug. 26, 1997 (explaining that, although the 13' Amendment of the Con-
stitution forbids patenting a human being, scientists are hoping to blur this line
through the patenting of transgenic species using human DNA).
188. See Carroll, supra note 13, at 2493. For further discussion regarding
HUGO's emphasis on international collaboration, see supra notes 92-100 and ac-
companying text.
189. See Looney, supra note 5, at 244 (stating that companies would lose their
investment if another company inadvertently received a patent for aspects of the
same gene); see also Marshall, supra note 107, at 30 (discussing backlog at U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office due to difficulty of determining similarity of various
patent applications).
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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
Developing an international agreement setting forth specifics of
the Common Heritage concept as applied to the HGP is vital to the
future of the HGP. Guidelines are necessary for economic' as well
as ethical interests. 9' In support of these interests, this section will
set out a proposed international treaty for the application of the
Common Heritage Principle to the HGP.
9 2
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE
APPLICATION OF THE COMMON HERITAGE OF
HUMANKIND TO THE HUMAN GENOME
PROJECT (1997)
The General Assembly,
Acknowledging that the human genome is an integral part of every
190. The world community needs to develop economic guidelines in order to
place all countries involved in the HGP on a level playing field. At present, coun-
tries are confused about whether to proceed in accordance with the original em-
phasis on international collaboration, or whether to protect their own investments
through patenting. For further discussion regarding this contention, see notes 92-
99 and accompanying text (discussing international collaboration), and notes 97-
99 and accompanying text (discussing individual countries' defensive actions in
patenting).
191. The ethical interests at stake include companies' attempts to claim property
rights to a human body part that is an integral part of our past, present, and future.
Additionally, most people do not know about the HGP; therefore, it is unfair to the
public for commercial interests to hoard these rights. For further discussion re-
garding ethical implications, see supra notes 27-47 and accompanying text.
192. This recommended treaty is adapted in part from various drafts of the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, reprinted in UNITED NATIONS,
OFFICE OF LEGAL AFFAIRS, DIVISION FOR OCEAN AFFAIRS AND THE LAW OF THE
SEA, THE LAW OF THE SEA: CONCEPT OF THE COMMON HERITAGE OF MANKIND
(1996) [hereinafter UNITED NATIONS DIVISION FOR OCEAN AFFAIRS]; the Bellagio
Declaration (resulting from the Bellagio Conference on Cultural AgencylCultural
Authority, in which Professor Boyle participated, and the draft of which Boyle
helped to write), available in BOYLE, supra note 33, at 192, and from various Ant-
arctic treaties which apply the Common Heritage concept to Antarctica, including:
1959 Antarctic Treaty, supra note 151, and the Conference on the Conservation of
Antarctic Marine Living Resources, [hereinafter Marine Resources Conference],
both reprinted in SIR ARTHUR WATTS, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ANTARCTIC
TREATY SYSTEM 301 (1992). These treaties have codified the traditional applica-
tions of the Common Heritage of Humankind principle. For further discussion of
the traditional applications of the Common Heritage of Humankind, see supra
notes 143-157 and accompanying text.
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human being'93 and that through their DNA, human beings hold the
blueprint of past and future generations,
94
Recognizing that the international community embarked on the
Human Genome Project with the intent of international collabora-
tion, 95
Recognizing that individual countries have since that time demon-
strated an interest in patenting their investments in the Human Ge-
nome Project,196
Anxious to prevent an international race to occupy various areas of
the human genome to the exclusion of other States, 19'
The international community hereby designates the human ge-
193. See Kirby, supra note 1, at 3 (explaining that DNA is found in the "nucleus
of each cell of our bodies").
194. See id. at 3 (stating that "[w]e bear in this generation, and project into the
next, the genetic messages which we carry within us").
195. See McKay, supra note 93, at 497; Cook-Deegan, supra note 23, at 112-13;
Carroll, supra note 13, at 2493. The 1959 Antarctic Treaty gave several specific
provisions through which to promote international collaboration of scientific in-
vestigation, including: "a) information regarding plans for scientific programs in
Antarctica shall be exchanged to permit maximum economy of and efficiency of
operations; b) scientific personnel shall be exchanged in Antarctica between expe-
ditions and stations; c) scientific observations and results from Antarctica shall be
exchanged and made freely available." 1959 Antarctic Treaty, supra note 151, art.
III. All of these provisions could correspond nicely with the international commu-
nity's desire for the HGP to remain an international effort. For example, scientists
could periodically transfer between universities in different countries in order to
share their methods of research regarding curing various diseases. For further dis-
cussion regarding international collaboration, see supra notes 92-96 and accompa-
nying text.
196. See Smith & Kettelberger, supra note 3, at 28, 46-48, 63; Langreth, supra
note 97, at B6. Professor Boyle also addresses this concern in his Bellagio Decla-
ration, by stating that:
Intellectual property laws have profound effects on issues as disparate as scientific and artistic
progress, biodiversity, access to information, and the cultures of indigenous and tribal peoples.
Yet all too often those laws are constructed without taking such effects into account, constructed
around a paradigm that is selectively blind to the scientific and artistic contributions of many of
the world's cultures and constructed in fora where those who will be most directly affected have
no representation.
BOYLE, supra note 33, at 193.
For further discussion regarding individual countries' attempts to patent gene
sequences, see supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
197. Cf. Revised Draft Resolution on the Law of the Sea, Cyprus-Liber.-Uru.,
U.N. Doc. A/C.1I/L.432/Rev.1 and Add.1 (addressing the seabed and ocean floor),
reprinted in UNITED NATIONS DIVISION FOR OCEAN AFFAIRS, supra note 192, at
74.
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nome as part of the Common Heritage of Humankind.9
Article 1: No Claim or Exercise of Sovereignty'99
1. No State shall claim or exercise sovereignty through patent
rights over any part of the human genome, nor shall any person,
natural or juridical, appropriate any part thereof."' No such claim or
exercise of sovereignty or sovereign rights, nor such appropriation
shall be recognized."'
2. All rights in the human genome are vested in humankind as a
whole.2
0 2
3. The foregoing does not include use of the particular gene for the
patenting of results derived therefrom, such as pharmaceuticals.0 3
198. Cf Draft Convention on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor beyond the Limits
of National Jurisdiction, art. 2, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C. 1/L.3 [hereinafter Seabed
and Ocean Floor Draft], reprinted in UNITED NATIONS DIVISION FOR OCEAN
AFFAIRS, supra note 192, at 306 (Part Three, work of the Third United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea, Second Session). The draft convention attrib-
utes the seabeds to the Common Heritage of Mankind by stating that "[t]he Area
and its resources are the Common Heritage of mankind [sic]." Id.
199. Cf Seabed and Ocean Floor Draft, supra note 198, art. 4, reprinted in
UNITED NATIONS DIVISION FOR OCEAN AFFAIRS, supra note 192, at 307 (Part
Three, work of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Sec-
ond Session) (addressing claims of state sovereignty over the seabed).
200. See id (substituting "human genome" for "the Area," and adding
"through patent rights"). The author incorporates patent rights to highlight the fact
that patent rights are presently the principal way that countries or corporations ex-
ercise sovereignty over the genome.
201. See id The author made no changes to this provision.
202 Cf Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, 8th Sess. art. 137(2),
U.N. Doc. NGI/16/Rev.1& Rev.l/Corr.1, reprinted in UNITED NATIONS DIVIsION
FOR OCEAN AFFAIRS, supra note 192, at 370 (replacing "the Area" with "the hu-
man genome").
203. This provision affirms the commercial potential of the human genome, but
clearly designates the genes themselves as unpatentable. This provision hopes to
accomplish this by encouraging the patenting of "process patents," while pre-
venting patenting of the genome itself. One potential danger is if a biotechnology
company patents a gene, it may preclude all other scientists from conducting fur-
ther beneficial research on that gene. For example, if a company patents the gene
for breast cancer, that company may hold the exclusive right to do research on that
gene.
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Article 2: Benefit of Humankind as a Whole2o4
1. The exploration of the genome and the exploitation of its con-
tents for the purpose of curing human diseases shall be carried out for
the benefit of humankind as a whole." 5
2. This use of the genome shall take into special consideration the
interests and needs of the developing countries." 6
Article 3: Preservation of the Genome Exclusively for Peaceful
Purposes2o7
1. The genome218 shall be reserved exclusively for peaceful pur-
poses, 2 9 and every effort shall be made to exclude it from develop-
ment of weapons for use in war.210
204. Cf Seabed and Ocean Floor Draft, supra note 198, art. 7, reprinted in
UNITED NATIONS DMSION FOR OCEAN AFFAIRS, supra note 192, at 308 (Part
Three, work of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Sec-
ond Session) (explaining that the purpose of conveying the seabed to the Common
Heritage is to benefit mankind as a whole).
205. See id. This provision is important because it emphasizes that the explora-
tion of the human genome should be for the benefit of all people, whether or not
they conduct research on the genome.
206. Cf Seabed and Ocean Floor Draft, supra note 198, art. 7, reprinted in
UNITED NATIONS DIVISION FOR OCEAN AFFAIRS, supra note 192, at 308 (Part
Three, work of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Sec-
ond Session) (stating that the exploitation of the seabed and ocean floor should
take into consideration the needs of developing countries). It is crucial that genome
research addresses the special needs of developing countries because they are the
least able to discover such technology and the most likely to be exploited by the
developed countries that can discover it. This disparity of power has allowed de-
veloped countries to exploit the genes of LDC citizens for commercial profit. For
further discussion regarding this inequality of power, see supra notes 136-137 and
accompanying text.
207. See id. art. 8, at 308. This draft interprets "peaceful purposes" as prohibit-
ing the use of the seabeds in the arms race and military endeavors. See id. The
1959 Antarctic Treaty also places an emphasis on the use of Antarctica "exclu-
sively for peaceful purposes," so that it does "not become the scene or object of
international discord." 1959 Antarctic Treaty, supra note 151, Preamble. It is
similarly vital to preserve the human genome for peaceful purposes. Otherwise, the
genome could become a powerful weapon for eugenic purposes such as gene ma-
nipulation to make one race stronger than another. For further discussion of
eugenic implications, see supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text.
208. Cf Seabed and Ocean Floor Draft, supra note 198, art. 8, at 308 (changing
"Area" to "genome").
209. See id.
210. Cf Seabed and Ocean Floor Draft, supra note 198, art. 4, reprinted in
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Article 4: Transfer of Technology2 to Developing Countries.n2
1. Developed countries shall cooperate in promoting the transfer of
technology relating to the exploration of the human genome" 3 and
the exploitation of its resources to developing countries and other
countries in need of such technology or know-how.' 4
2. This technology transfer shall occur through terms set by the
Human Genome Organization. 5
UNITED NATIONS DIVISION FOR OCEAN AFFAIRS, supra note 192, at 308 (Pt. 3,
work of the 3d U.N. Conf. on the Law of the Sea, 2d Sess.) (proposing provisions
that exclude the seabed from the arms race and prohibit its use for military pur-
poses).
211. It is important to promote scientific investigation in the HGP, in order to
develop cures for disease and to more fully understand our genetic past and future.
The 1959 Antarctic Treaty addresses this emphasis on scientific research by stating
that "[fireedom of scientific investigation in Antarctica and co-operation toward
that end .. .shall continue, subject to the provisions of the present Treaty." 1959
Antarctic Treaty, supra note 151, art. II. Thus, the proposed treaty does not seek to
stifle scientific investigation, but merely to distribute its fruits globally.
212. See Seabed and Ocean Floor Draft, supra note 198, art. 12, at 312. The
author adds "to developing countries" in order to clarify further the disparity in
technological advancement between developed and developing countries.
213. See id (changing "the Area" to "human genome").
214. See id Sharing technology will enable developing countries to develop
their own cures for disease and decide whether to use their unique genetic pools
for research. For further discussion regarding developed countries' current exploi-
tation of the genes of indigenous peoples, see supra notes 141-142 and accompa-
nying text
215. Sharing based on terms set by the Human Genome Organization will help
LDCs to become self-sufficient rather than dependent on developed countries for
cures for diseases. See Carroll, supra note 13, at 2466 (discussing LDCs' reluc-
tance to engage in technology, for fear that developed countries will dictate the
terms of technology transfer).
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Article 5: Preserving the Genome Intact26
1. Subject to the following exceptions, the genome shall remain
intact, and shall not be altered for the purpose of eugenic enhance-
ment of the human race.217
2. This preservation includes a prohibition on alteration of genes
for any purpose except that which is necessary for the prevention of
deadly diseases.2 I8
216. Cf Seabed and Ocean Floor Draft, supra note 198, art. 4, reprintede in
UNITED NATIONS DIVISION FOR OCEAN AFFAIRS, supra note 192, at 313 (address-
ing protection of the marine environment). The author analogizes protection of the
human genome to protection of the marine environment. The purpose of the origi-
nal provision was to protect the marine environment from "pollution and contami-
nation, and other hazards to the marine environment.. .interference with the eco-
logical balance of the marine environment, particular attention being paid to the
need for protection from activities such as drilling, dredging, excavation, [and]
disposal of waste ... ." Id. A conservation provision prevents over-harvesting of
natural resources. See Marine Resources Conference, supra note 192, art. II, re-
printed in WATTS, supra note 192, at 321. The Conference addresses this concern
by stating:
Recognizing that harvesting of Antarctic marine living resources is presently taking place... the
Conference calls upon the parties: 1. Totake all possible steps to bring the Convention on the
Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources into force as soon as possible; To show the
greatest possible care and concern.. .in any harvesting of Antarctic marine living resources....
Id.
Similarly, biotechnology corporations have "harvested" and patented the genes
of aboriginal peoples. Although this exploitation does not currently pose a problem
of environmental overuse, it demonstrates the use of a natural resource for com-
mercial profit, without just compensation to the owners of that resource. See supra
notes 141-142 and accompanying text (discussing the patenting of aboriginal peo-
ples' genes). The international community must preserve the ecological balance of
the human genome, as it does the ocean floor and Antarctica. Because the human
genome is the result of centuries of evolution, humans cannot predict the long-
term effects of genetic manipulation. See Maha F. Munayyer, Comment, Genetic
Testing and Germ-Line Manipulation: Constructing a New Language for Interna-
tional Human Rights, 12 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 687 (1997). Therefore, the
human genome deserves protection from any unnecessary scientific alteration. See
id. For further discussion of the eugenic implications of the HGP, see supra notes
37-42 and accompanying text.
217. Adapted from Seabed and Ocean Floor Draft, supra note 198, art. 13, re-
printed in United NATIONS DIVISION FOR OCEAN AFFAIRS, supra note 192, at 313.
218. This Comment defines "deadly diseases" as diseases that are likely to
cause death or great pain and suffering. Allowing gene therapy for the purpose of
disease prevention makes it difficult to define which diseases should be included,
because the symptoms of pain and suffering would not be apparent. Instead, the
only indicator of the disease would be the genetic predisposition to getting the dis-
ease. Although technology should attempt to alleviate pain and suffering, it should
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Article 6. General Principles Regarding Economic Aspects of the
Human Genome Project219
1. Because corporations have the opportunity to reap economic
benefits from "process patents"" 0 derived from genomic discoveries
as set out in Article 1(3), no state, nor private corporation, shall pat-
ent the gene in its basic form."
Article 7: Role of the Human Genome Organization (HUGO)222
1. The Human Genome Organization shall hereby be in charge of
advocating and protecting the status of the Common Heritage of
Humankind as applied to the human genome.tm
not go so far as to enhance a perfectly healthy individual. See Rick Weiss, Gene
Enhancement's Thorny Ethical Traits; Rapid-Fire Discoveries Force Examination
of Consequences, WASH. POST, Oct. 12, 1997, at AI (describing dilemmas gene
therapy specialists have experienced based on requests from a sports medicine
doctor interested in increasing an athlete's muscle mass, and a doctor interested in
changing his patient's skin color for cosmetic reasons.) The author is ambivalent
about setting strict guidelines regarding which conditions can be altered and which
cannot. For further discussion regarding the drawbacks of eugenics, see supra
notes 37-42 and accompanying text.
219. Cf Work of the Third United Nations Conference on the Lmv of the Sea,
Fourth Session, reprinted in UNITED NATIONS DMSION FOR OCEAN AFFAIRS, su-
pra note 193, at 341 (changing "the Area" to "the Human Genome Project").
220. A "process patent" is a patent for a non-obvious method used to obtain a
gene sequence. See Kate H. Murashige, Genome Research and Traditional Intel-
lectual Property Protection-A Bad Fit? 7 RISK: HEALTH SAFETY & ENV'T 231,
237 (1996). In Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed.
Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 856 (1991), the court's analysis "requiring the
gene to be wedded to a nonobvious process indicates a reluctance to patent naked
genes." Erramouspe, supra note 81, at 993. Indeed, "patent protection is unneces-
sary for a substance simply isolated in its natural form because the substance sig-
nals no further improvement." Id. at 989.
221. The United States Supreme Court has decisively held that substances in
their naturally occurring state shall not be patented. See Cochrane v. Badishe Ani-
lin & Soda Fabrik, 111 U.S. 293, 311-12 (1884) (holding that a dye extracted from
the madder root could not be patented because the synthesized chemical derived
from the root had the same chemical formula as the naturally occurring substance);
Erramouspe, supra note 220, at 988 (articulating the holding of Cochrane).
222. Because HUGO is presently the central worldwide decision-making body
of the HGP, it is logical to vest HUGO with the responsibility of enforcing the
Common Heritage concept. For further discussion on HUGO's present responsi-
bilities, see supra notes 63, 93 and accompanying text.
223. For further discussion on HUGO's present responsibilities, see supra notes
63-93 and accompanying text.
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2. In this capacity, HUGO shall take on the additional role of bal-
ancing private and public interests in the human genome through en-
couraging technology development and facilitating the free exchange
of information between countries.224
3. HUGO shall, moreover, safeguard the rights of the public
against private entities' claims of ownership over the human ge-
nome.
225
Article 8: Involvement of the Public in Regulation of the Human
Genome
1. In order to apply the Common Heritage principle to the Human
Genome Project, the public must be educated about the ethical, legal,
and social implications of the Human Genome Project.
2. Therefore, all countries must continually involve the public in
the formation of international guidelines regarding the Human Ge-
nome Project. In order to accomplish this, scientists and corporations
must enlist the help of lawyers, sociologists, ethicists, and citizens 26
in deliberating on the ethical issues involved with the HGP. All busi-
ness regarding the HGP must be made in a forum open to the pub-
lic. 22
7
3. Each country shall donate a significant amount of its budget al-
located for the Human Genome Project, to a fund designated to study
and educate the public regarding the ethical, social, and legal impli-
cations of the Human Genome Project.28
224. See id.
225. See id.
226. See Kirby, supra note 1, at 20. One participant at the Bilbao Conference
argued that those who fund and manage the HGP should be responsible for edu-
cating citizens about the HGP. See id. at 14.
227. See Annas, supra note 2, at 651.
228. This provision is modeled after the ELSI program, which devotes a signifi-
cant proportion of its budget to testing and counseling for cystic fibrosis. See
Thomson, supra note 2, at 56. At present, only five percent of the total budget for
the U.S. Human Genome Project is set aside for the study of the ethical, legal and
social implications of the HGP. See id. Because discovering what will occur after
the genome is mapped and sequenced is at least as important as actually accom-
plishing the substantive task, a substantial proportion of each country's funding
designated for the Human Genome Project should go to an equivalent of the ELSI
program. For further discussion regarding the ELSI program, see supra notes 54-
56 and accompanying text.
260 [13:219
PROPERTY RIGHTS TO THE HUMAN GENOME
This proposed treaty represents an effort to begin deliberations
on setting an international guideline regarding rights to the human
genome through the application of the Common Heritage of Human-
kind. This proposed treaty is intentionally broad due to the author's
stated belief that the worldwide community should make the vital
decisions concerning the human genome in correspondence with its
collective ethical beliefs.229
Because experts are predicting that the HGP will be completed in
less than ten years, the international community must start setting
guidelines now. Although the issues associated with the HGP are dif-
ficult to resolve, the international community must start tackling
them instead of prolonging them for future generations to manage."
V. CONCLUSION
The Common Heritage principle is the best method by which to
balance the public's interest in keeping genome information freely
accessible against private companies' interests in profiting from ge-
nome research." Due to the various ethical implications of the HGP,
companies should not be able to claim ownership to any part of the
genome until the public is informed of the ownership claim and is
able to participate in creating regulations for the use of the genome.
President Clinton's reference to the HGP is a good start for a dia-
logue between the public and private interests concerning the HGP. 2
229. At present, no international consensus exists, as is evidenced by countries'
uncertainty of whether to patent or to promote international collaboration. Fur-
thermore, the general public is informed about neither the HGP nor its ethical im-
plications. Therefore, the author would be at a loss to introduce her own sense of
morals as that of the international community.
230. See Kirby, supra note 1, at 20 (stating that we must address these issues
instead of dismissing them as too difficult).
231. Although the companies would not be able to profit from gene sequence
patents, they would still be able to profit from drugs made from those genes. See
Murashige, supra note 220, at 235 (explaining that a pharmaceutical drug used to
treat genetic disorders may receive a patent).
232. See Clinton, supra note 4 and accompanying text (discussing President
Clinton's Inaugural Address).
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